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GENERALIZED SHAPLEY VALUES BY SIMPLICIAL SAMPLING
* B. von Hohenbalken and T. Levesque **
Characteristic function representation of n-person cooperative
games precludes the modelling of structural properties of a game
other than the relationship between coalition structure and the
worth of a game. This means that the Shapley value, a measure of
expected return to a player from playing the game, is restricted
as a solution concept to only those games satisfying the condition
that all coalitions of the same cardinality are equiprobable.
By contrast, as we demonstrate below, Shapley's three axioms
are satisfied for Shapley-like measures based on richer character-
izations of a game. In particular, we extend the Shapley value
to a class of abstract games for which the roles that players
assume are determinants of the likelihood of particular coalitions
and for which the original Shapley value can be found as .a special
case.
In Section 1 we briefly consider Shapley's axioms and two possible
derivations of the Shapley value. Section 2 discusses two recent
formal attempts to extend the Shapley value to games for which the
structure of roles is important. Section 3 presents our notion of
a "clique" structure as a formalization of relationships among
roles and describes our extension of the Shapley value. Since
calculation of Shapley values (especially generalized ones) is
computationally problematic for games involving sizeable numbers
of players, we describe in Section 4 a sampling approach on
(deformed) simplices to estimate (generalized) Shapley values.
Professor of Economics, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada.
presently at IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria; research partially
supported by Canada Council Grant No.4510496.
** Assistant Professor of Economics, Wilfrid Laurier University,
Waterloo, Canada.
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SECTION 1
Shapley defined a game to be a superadditive set function (the
characteristic function v) from the power set of a universe, U,
of players to the real line. An abstract game is the class of
games TIV define on the set of one-to-one mappings, IT(U), of U
onto itself when
nv(nS) = v(S) (all SCD).
An abstract game exhibits the property that;; the worth of a
coalition is invariant under the identities of the players
that form it, depending rather on the roles they assume. For
any game v, a set NCU and all ｩ ｴ ｳ ｾ ｰ ･ ｲ ｳ ･ ｴ ｳ are called carriers
of v if:
ｶ Ｈ ｓ ｾ Ｉ = v (S) (all SCU);
that, is, for any v, the set of players can be partitioned into
sets of real and dummy players, the dummies having no effect on
the worth of a coalition.
Shapley sought to construct a value ¢[v] of a game v which
satisfied three axioms:
Axiom 1: ¢n. [TIv] = ¢i[V]
1
(all nEIT (U) )
That is, value depends only on role and not on which players
assume the roles. Value is thus an intrinsic property of the
abstract game.
Axiom 2: L ¢. [v] = v (N)
n 1
(all N, carriers of v)
Axiom 2 requires that ﾢ ｾ ｝ exhibit joint efficiency. Combined
with the definition of a carrier it also implies that the value
of the game for dummy playersis zero.
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Axiom 3: ｾ ｛ ｶ Ｋ ｷ ｝ = ｾＨｶ｝ + ｾＨｷ｝
for any two games v and w; i.e. the value of any game must be
independent of the play of any other game.
Shapley demonstrated that for a game V a unique value
ｾ Ｈ ｶ ｝ exists satisfying axioms 1 to 3 and having the form:
1.1 ｾ • (v]
1
I"
= L
S 3 i
StN
(s - 1) ! (n - s) !
n !
s is the cardinality of S, n is the number of players (including
dummies) playing v and Vi(S) is the "marginal characteristic
function"
1.2 v.(S)=v(S)-v(s\ii}).
1
Expression (1.1) has commonly been interpreted in a probability
framework. That is, since all coalitions of size s are equally
likely y ,
n!
1.3 (s - 1 )! (n - s) I= In -
i,s -
1\ -1
1 )
is just the probability that any coalition S is realized. ｾ Ｎ (v]
1
is player i's expected contribution to a coalition where the
expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of coalitions.
Shapley proposed,as well, a bargaining model of coalition
formation that would yield the value ｾ Ｈ ｶ ｝ as the expected outcome.
Each of the n! orders of the players may be thought of as gener-
ated by the successive arrivals of the players at some given point
to form the present coalition N. Player i is awarded Vi(S) only
if the players S\{il have arrived before him. For any order t
let
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(1 • 4) St (i) = {j E N I t{ j) 2 t (i) }
where t{i) is the position index of player i. If order t occurs
player i receives v. (St{i)). Since Shapley's (implicit)
\ ｾ
assumption of equiprobable coalitions is clearly equivalent to
assuming that all orders have the same probability 1" player
n.
its expected marginal contribution to all ｣ ｯ ｡ ｾ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ in which
he participates can thus be written
(1. 5) <Pi [v]
n!
= ｾf.
t=1
1
n!
(1.5) is an alternative representation of Shapley's value, that
is ｰ ｾ ｲ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｲ ｬ ｹ suitable for the generalizations to be discussed
below.
An apparent weakness of the Shapley value is its restriction
to games for which all coalitions of the same size (and equivalent-
ly, all orders) are equally likely. There are many examples of
games which do not meet this condition because of relationships
among the roles (rather ,than the personalities of players) enhancing
the likelihood of some coalitions while diminishing that of others.
A foremost example are the inter- and intra-party relations of
legislative representatives, which in most countries will make a
majority of coalition structures extremely unlikely. It is thus
of interest to investigate the value of such games. The usual
vehicle to do this is expression (l.5) 'above, but with differen-
tiated probabilities Pt of orders replacing ｾ Ａ Ｇ i.e.
(l. 6) G<p. [v]
ｾ
n!
= L Pt
t=l
,Before discussing our own approach in section 3, we consider two
models of Shapley-like values (Kilgour 1974, Owen 1971)
that proceed along these lines.
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SECTION 2
The first author, Kilgour (1974), explicitly· introduces (1.6),
but his main tool is a redefinition of the characteristic function.
His goal is to determine the effect on value of a subset Q eN of
quarrelling players, no two of which will join the same coalition;
this behaviour can be described by a characteristic function that
is strictly additive if more than one quarreller participates in
a "coalition". Let v be the game without quarrelling; then
[v,Q] = v* represents the game with quarrelling, where v* is de-
fined by:
(2.1 )
(2.2)
v*(S) = v(S) if IsnQI = 1
v*(SU{k}) = v(S) + v({k}), if IsnQ\ = 1, kEQ
We note that incrementally constructed coalitions are needed
if v* is to be determinate; i.e., if S nQ = <j> and k and j
are quarrellers, then v* Is U {k} U { j }) will in general depend
on the order in whichk and j joinS.
Kilgour's value <j>[v,Q] is not a true generalization of the
original Shapley value, since it satisfies Shapley's joint
efficiency axiom only under v* but not under v. This is so
because quarrelling reduces the payoff to cooporation for many
"coalitions"; in particular, v(N) is nbt attainable for essential
games and hence
nI <j>.[V,Q] < v(N)
. 1 11=
violating axiom 2.
1 IQI > 2
Owen's ( 1971 ) approach to the problem motivated our own
extension of the Shapley value. Like Kilgour, Owen focuses on
games for which information about relationships among players
influences the probabilities of different orderings, but he
models a continuous concept of "affinity" between players, rather
than Kilgour's absolute repulsion within a certain subset of them.
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He does this by introducing a ｧ･ｯｭｾｩ｣ｦｲ｡ｭ･ｷｯｲｫＬ in which
players are assigned to points, pi, on ad-sphere (d 2. n -2) ,
with the points chosen such that the distances m between them
(geodesic or Euclidean) directly reflect the relative mutual
attractions between players. For instance, two players assigned
antipodal points are least attracted to each other. It is now
possible to derive theoretically the probabilities Pt (in 1.6)
of different orderings, which depend on the system of affinities
between players as follows:
Each point, z, on the sphere produces an ordering t if
implies t(i) < t(j) < ••• < "t(k)
If the sphere has full dimensionality d = n - 2, i. e., if the
player- points pi are arranged affinely independently, there
exists Ｈ ｾ Ｉ ､ ｩ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｮ ｣ ｴ hyperplanes through the sphere's center,
which are orthogonai to the Ｈ ｾ Ｉ ｳ ･ ｧ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ ｳ between each pair of
player ｰ ｯ ｩ ｲ ｩ ｴ ｾ ｾ Ｎ These ｨ ｹ ｰ ･ ｲ ｰ ｬ ｡ ｮ ･ ｾ slice the sphere into exact-
ly n! regions (more precisely, n! spherical polytopes), and all
points in the interior of each region produce the same unambig-
uous strict order. The probability Pt of the order t is then
defined as the ratio of the measure of the region producing t
to the measure of the whole ｳ ｰ ｨ ･ ｲ ･ Ｎ ｾ Ｏ Given the probabilities
Pt could actually be extracted, their application to (1.6)
would yield a generalized Shapley value.
Owen's value is shown to have two properties deemed desirable:
1. An ordering and its reversal are equiprobable.
2. The exclusion from the game of a set of players will
not affect the probabilities of the relative order-
ings of the remaining players.
The desirability of property (1) is a natural consequence of
the possibility that an issue initiating a game may be stated
either positively or negatively; in addition it ensures the equal-
ity of the power and the blocking index. Property (2) implies
independence of the degree of affinity between any two players
from whoever else plays the game.
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Owen's basic idea of using a measure of attraction between
players, and the associated spherical framework are appealing
on the theoretical level. Computability and empirical use are
quite different matters and here the prospects are not good.
First, the information requirements of Owen's value are high.
It is surprisingly difficult to find enough independent criteria
to place n points affinely independently into n-space (where they
then define an (n-2) - sphere), as n becomes larger. It is equally
frustrating to try to define a mapping that distributes lower-
dimensional clusters of n points onto an (n - 2) - sphere in any
meaningful fashion. Secondly, even if that goal could be attain-
ed, it is virtually impossible to compute the volumes of n!
(n - 3) - dimensional polytopes on the surface of that sphere, for
n > 4.
To avoid these difficulties Owen suggests that ､ ･ ｾ ･ ｮ ･ ｲ ｡ ｴ ･
spheres of dimensionality 1, 2 and possibly 3 could be used for
an approximate derivation of n-person values. The trouble with
this approach is that a great majority of orderings are immediate-
ly excluded from consideration which leads to intolerable dis-
tortions. ｾ Ｎ Ｏ
As another avenue to circumvent the computational impasse
of Owen's full dimensional value we tried our sampling approach
(see Section 4) adapted to spheres. There are various ways of
drawing·· uniformly distributed sample points z on an (n - 2)-
sphere, but none of them is computationally simple, and at least
one method becomes numerically unstable in higher dimensions.
The spherical environment furthermore requires, for each sample
point, the calculation of n Euclidean distances in n-space, a
non-trivial computational burden.
In summary Owen's value represents a genuine generalization
of Shapley's value but its actual use is severely impeded by
informational and computational obstacles.
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SECTION 3
The goals set for our modification of the Shapley value, ｾ ｛ ｶ ,C,A]
are:
(a) ｾ ｛ ｖ Ｌ ｃ Ｌ ａ ｝ (see (3.1) below) should require only a modest
amount of information beyond the characteristic function.
(b) ｾ ｛ ｖ Ｌ ｃ Ｌ ａ ｝ should be a true generalization of Shapley's
value, i.e., it should satisfy Shapley's three axioms and the
original Shapley value should emerge as a special case.
(c) ｾ ｛ ｖ Ｌ ｃ Ｌ ａ ｝ should be easy to approximate computationally.
Points (a) and (b) will be answered in the course of this section,
point (c) in the next.
As mentioned in Section 1, Shapley defines a game as its
characteristic function v. We generalize the notion of a game
to a triple [v,C,A] , where v is the characteristic ｦ ｵ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｮ Ｌ C is
a partition of the set of players N, called a clique structure,
and A is ｾ collusion parameter, a scalar. Players belonging ｾ ｯ
a clique C E C, C eN are postulated to have mt-tual affinity ,
(measured by 02. A <1) but not to players be..:-or"ging to other
cliques.
Since clique membership can be signified for ecch player by ,I.
single number and because the same collusion ｰ ｡ ｲ Ｓ ｭ ･ ｴ ･ ｾ A is
assumed to apply to all cllques, the informaticD requirements
(given the char. function) aI'c n + 1 numbers, which compares
favourably with Owen's Ｈ ｾ Ｉ distances. Information about cliques .is
furthermore easily available, and thus goal (a) is met.
Shapley's axiom 1 remains satisfied by our assuming that
clique membership is a property of roles, re her than of person-
alities of players.
j E C implies 1( j Ec 1(
(see also footnote !/) .
all 1( E ｾ (U)
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(Our implicit use of axioms 2 and 3 is identical to Shapley's
and thus they remain untouched). If the clique structure is
trivial ("X= 0 for any C, or C={N}, or C={{l} {2}, ... ,
{n}}) the game is essentially described by valone, and the con-
comitant value is Shapley's original one. The above implements
goal (b).
Parallel to Owen (1971 ), we aim at assigning higher
probabilities of formation to certain coalitions (of given size);
in our case the selected. coalitions will be those which contain
relatively fewer incomplete cliques. The natural route is again
to operate on orders t of players, i.e. to find appropriately
differentiated probabilities pt·and to apply them to
(3.1)
n!
¢.[v,C,"X] = L ptV.(S (i»
1 t=l 1 t
which is the generalized Shapley value (compare formula 1.5) .
Theorem (3.2 ) below digresses briefly to establish a firm, al-
beit partial foundation for this indirect line of attack, which
is also used, but not proved, by Kilgour and Owen (see footnote
2) •
Definition: An order t of n players is clique-preserving if the
members of every clique appear contiguously in t.
Definition: A partial clique is a strict, nonempty subset of a
clique.
Theorem 3.2: If clique-preserving orders have probability
Pt > !" then coalitions that include at most one partial cliquen.
are more likely than coa1itioJ'E of the same size containing more
than one partial clique.
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Proof: Let S be any coalition of size Si the probability of S
is just
cdS) 1+£+[8(s) -a(S)] l-cS
n 1 ---nr-
where
8 (s) = s 1 (n - s)! is the total number of orders for
which the first s elements are contained in S, a(S) is the
number of such orders which are also clique-preserving and
1+£ 1-6 h bb'l" f I' 'd
---,-, ---.- are t e pro a 1 1t1es 0 c 1que-preserv1ng ann. n. .
non-clique preserving orders, respectively (£ > 0 by assumption
for any nontrivial clique structure,and £ > 0 implies 6 > 0) •
Now, if a particular coalition Sl contains more than one
partial clique, a (Sl) = 0 and thus Ft(Sl) = 8(s) 1;1 0 • If
another coalition S2 of the same size s contains at most one
partial clique, a(S2) > 0 and pr(S2) = a(S2) £n+l o+ ＸＨｓＩｬｮＭｲｾ i thus
pr(S2) > pr(Sl)' Q.E.D.
Returning to the development of games and values with clique
structure, we now introduce a geometric representation of such
games that allow the measurement (and later the computation) of
the probabilities Pt of nl orders t:
Rather than points on a sphere, we assign each player i £ N
i
a vertex p , i = 1, 2, ... , n of a simplex
sP = {z E P. n n'"'Z = L
i=l
iP Xi I x , = 1,
1
x,
1
> 0 }
Collecting the pi,s as columns of a matrix P, one can write:
sP = {z £ Rn I z = Px I x. = 11 x. > O}1-
We shall call P the basis of sP, which spans or generates Sp·
The x. 's are barycentric coordinates of z, w.r.t. P.
1
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The connection between points Z E: sF and orders t of players
is as follows:
Each point Z produces an order t if
implies
t(i) < t(j) < ••• < t (k)
the z. are the Cartesian coordinates of z and the t(i) the position
1
indices of players i in the order t. If P is the identity matrix
( 12 n) (h h i i . )I = e, e , .•. , e were t e p = e are un1t vectors
sP is the unit simplex
S I { Rn 1 '. I \" x. = 1, x. > O} ,.= XE: x= x, l. 1 1-
Ifor x E: S , the barycentric and Cartesian coordinates of x obvious-
ly coincide.
sI depicts games without or with a trivial clique structure,
and its use leads to the original Shapley value. Indeed, the
simplex SI splits into n! subsimplices, such that all points x
in the interior of each subs implex produce the same unambiguous
strict order. The subsimplices thus defined are obviously con-
gruent and considering a probability mass uniformly distributed
over SI, each subsimplex represents the same probability, i.e.
Pt = ｾＡ for all t. Applying these Pt in (3.1) clearly yields the
plain Shapley value.
Now the clique structure C is brought into play: For each
clique C E: C, the points pi associated with players i in the
clique are moved toward their common centroid (which lies, if the
clique contains c players, in the center of an (c - 1) - face of
SI). How much they ｡ ｲ ･ ｾ moved depends on the size of the collusion
parameter A.
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Fbr example, let N = {1,2,3}, C = {{1,2},{3}}, ). = ｾＮ Then
1 1 2 ro 015]
P = [{1_).)e1+).e +e = LOo 252
2 1 2 [00251p = [(I_).)e2+).e +e ] =
°075J2
p3
=
e
3
= HJ
The associated basis is
123 [0075 0.25 np = [p ,p ,p ] = 0.25 0.75° °
P is a doubly $tochastic matrix (i.e. both rows and columns sum
to 1),that represents a linear,nonsingular, symmetric contraction
mapping, with det P = ｾ 2 1. If applied to SI, it yields
sP = {zERn\Z=Px, LX. =1, x. >o}
1 1-
I
Pig. 3.1 depicts both SI and sP and the regions associated with
the orders Pt.
/1" sP/' \"
I S1/I \
I \
i \
I \,/ )1L ') 1 IIＬｾ
I
..
/
nl \I
,'nI
i
. l.
t
x E SI being uniformly
ｭ ｡ ｴ ｲ ｩ ｾ representing a
mapping defining
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Fig. 3.1 also shows that the sections of sP containing the non-
clique-preserving orders (1 3 2) and (2 3 1) are much smaller
than the others having clique-preserving orders and further, that
their measure can be made arbitrarily small as A ｾ 1.
The above exemplified procedure can clearly be carried out
for any number of players and any clique structure, with the
mapping P retaining the indicated properties. The next theorem
gives a summary.
Theorem 3.3. Let SI be a unit simplex with
distributed. Let P be a doubly stochastic
linear, nonsingular, symmetric contraction
P
z = Px E S . Then
(a) the transformed density on the contracted simplex sP is uni-
form;
(b) l . Pthe mathematical expectations of xES and z E S are equal
(c) theprombility of non-clique-preserving orders is smaller on
sP than on SI, given the clique structure defining P is not
trivial.
Proof: (a) follows from the fact that the Jacobean of the in-
verse mapping x = p-lz is nonzero and constant.
(b) The mean of a uniform distribution on any simplex equals the
(ordinary) mean of the simplex I vertices. Ex E SI thus equals
｛ ｾ ｾ ... ｾ ｝ Ｎ The vertices of sP are just the columns of P, and
n,n, - ,n
since P is doubly stochastic it follows by (a) that E z E sP is
also ｛ ｾ ｾ ... !]
n, n, - - ·,n
(c) The result of applying the transformation P to x E 51 is that
coordinates of z = P x E sP corresponding to players belonging to
the same clique are nearer their common mean (and therefore closer
together), while these means themselves remain invariant for all
cliques. Thus for any three players i, j and k, where k does not
- 14 -
belong to the clique of i and j, it follows that
Pr (z. < zk < z .) < Pr (x. < x k < x. )ｾ J ｾ J
Q.E.D.
The theoretical framework discussed sofar is clearly capable
of generating reasonable and consistent variations in the prob-
abilities Pt of the orders of players, which could be used to
calculate modified Shapley values. A blemish is still present,
however: The probabilities culled from sP do not satisfy Owen's
property 1; as Fig. 3.1 shows, sections of sP representing some
orders may neither be congruent nor equal in measure to the
sections associated with the reversals of these orders. Fortu-
nately, an easy remedy is available: Since carriers of a game
can be arbitrarily enlarged, one simply adds dummy players to the
smaller cliques (if any) until all cliques are of equal size.
This evens out heterogeneous clique structures (which are res-
ponsible for the asymmetries violating property 1) and in con-
sequence the contracted simplex sP becomes centrally symmetric.
Using the example given above, {3} EC is augmented by dummy
player 4, resulting in C' = {{1,2}, {3,4}}.
The associated matrix P is then
0.75
0.25
,-
P =
"\0.25 0 0;
0.75 0 0 I
0.75 0.25J
o 0 0.25 0.75
which, when applied to a suitably enlarged SI yields c simplex
sP whose 4! sections appear in symmetric pairs, e.g., the order
( 1 2 3 4) is represented by a polytope congruent to the one
containing the ｲ ･ ｶ ･ ｲ ｾ ･ order (4 3 2 1).
Again, this symmetrization clearly generalizes without
difficulty to clique structures with any number and size of
cliques. The sampling procedure discussed in the next section
uses this approach computationally.
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SECTION 4.
Exact calculation of Shapley values for large games has always
presented a problem due to the combinatorially large numbers of
probabilities of coalitions (or orders) that have to be eval-
uated. Owen (1975) and Manne and St.l.iiJ?le¥(19 6 2) have given approx-
imation procedures that have been used to find values for the
u.S. electoral college. The exact calculation of generalized
Shapley values is even more difficult because the volumes on n!
high-dimensional polytopes would have to be computed (this holds
for both Owen's and our generalization) .
A strikingly simple remedial idea is to adapt a sampling
approach to the problem, thus making (generalized) Shapley values
easily accessible to any desired and - affordable - degree of
accuracy.
For our simplkialmodel the procedure is as follows: After
the clique structure C has been symmetrized by the addition of
duriunies (if any) the game contains m > n players. A uniformly
random m - vector x E SI (the (m-l) - dimensional unit simplex)
is drawn i/ and transformed into z = P x E sP by the m by m con-
traction [latrix P, that was derived from C' and the collusion
parameter 0 < A. < 1. A reordering of the players 1,2, ... , n, ...m
according to the values of the coordinates of the vector z yields
an order t, which is used to evaluate the order-dependent marginal
characteristic function V. (St (i») for each player i -= N (dummy
. 1
players always get zero and can be ignored at this point). Each
player i then receives the indicated number of tokens, the draw
of another x E SI is made, etc. After the allot ted number of
sample draws is exhausted the tokens each player has received are
toted up and the approximate (generalized) ｓ ｾ ｡ ｰ ｬ ･ ｹ value of each
,
player is obtained by dividing his holdings by the total number
of tokens disbursed.
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Following standard statistical theory, confidence intervals
can be derived for each player's value ｾ Ｎ independently. If the
1
sample size is k > 30, the 95% confidence interval is
ｾ
rｾ i (lk- ｾ i)JｾＮ + 1.961
....
The expected accuracy of values approximated in the above fashion
thus increases rather slowly with the square root of sample size,
but it is surprisingly unaffected by large numbers of players.
E.g., our trial solutions for the 50 u.s. state electoral college
game, with sample sizes of 3000, were remarkably close to the
values found by Mann and Shapley (1962), despite the relatively
insignificant computational effort required.
In Table 1, we give a well-documented APL-code called VALUE,
I
that uses our simplicial model and the above sampling approach to
calculate generalized Shapley values for the special case of ｷ ･ ｩ ｧ ｨ ｴ ｾ
ed majority games with simple majority. We chose this case because
its simple 0-1 characteristic function can be found solely on the
basis of voting strengths o£ players (a mere n-vector).
Table 2 shows 3 sample computations with VALUE, of the ｾ ｬ ｩ ｱ ｵ ･ ﾭ
structured game "My aunt and I": "My aunt" (player 1) has tw,:
votes and forms a clique with her nephew":':" (player 2), who 110.s
one vote; two other players (3 and 4) with ore vote each stand by
themselves. If the clique {1,2} does not ｣ ｯ ｬ ｬ ｾ ､ ･ (A /= 0), the
precise Ｈ ｓ ｨ ｡ ｰ ｬ ･ ｾ value is
III 1ｾ｛ｏ｝ = [2''6''6'6]. With A= 0.5 the power distribution
becomes. about
ｾ ｛ Ｐ Ｎ Ｕ ｝ = [0.6,0.2,0.1,0.1], and tLc. .. _miting result, with
players 1 and 2 always acting together, should be
2 14'[0.9999]= [3'3,0,0].
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vVALUEAHOW[[I]v
v VALUEAHOW
[1] 'THE FUNCTION VALUE APPROXIMATES GENERALIZED SHAPLEY'
[2J 'VALUES FOR GAMES INVOLVING CLIQUES, FOR THE SPECIAL'
[31 'CASE OF WEIGHTED VOTING GAMES WITH SIMPLE MAJORITY.'
[4] 'LOCAL INPUTS: V, N-VECTOR OF VOTES,'
[5J 'C, MATRIX REPRESENTING CLIQUE STRUCTURE, E.G., FOR 3 '
[6J 'PLAYERS 1,2 3, 1 AND 2 IN CLIQUE, C=(2 2)pl 2 3 0'
e7] 'INPUTS ENTERED ON REQUEST: ｏｾｌ＼ｬＬ SCALAR COLLUSION'
C8] 'PARAMETER (l=O MEANS NO COLLUSION)'
[9] 's, SCALAR. SAMPLE SIZE'
Cl0] 'OUTPUT: S, Nx4 MATRIX; 1ST COL.: PLAYER NUMBERS,'
Cl1] '2ND COL.:VOTES, 3RD COL.: VALUES SUMMING TO TOTAL VOTES,'
[12] '4TH COL.: VALUES SUMMING TO UNITY'
v
vVAU.Ir,[[]]v
v ｓｾｃ VALUE V;I;J;K;L;M;N;P;T
[1] nClIQUE MATRIX; ADDITION OF DUMMIES
[2] ｃ ｾ Ｈ ｐ ｃ Ｉ ｐ Ｈ ｴ ｃ ｽ Ｋ ｋ ｜ Ｈ ｰ ｖ Ｉ Ｋ ｜ Ｋ Ｏ ｋ ｾ ｏ ］ Ｌ ｃ
[3] nCONTRACTION MATRIX (LOOP 1)
[4] ｬ ｾ ｄ Ｌ ｏ Ｏ ｏ ｾ Ｇ ｅ ｎ ｔ ｅ ｒ COLLUSION PARAMETER'
[5] ｐ Ｎ ｋ ｯ Ｎ ］ ｋ ｾ ｜ ｸ Ｏ ｰ ｃ ｸ ｉ ｾ ｬ
[6] ａ ｴ Ｚ ｋ ｦ ﾷ ｆ Ｇ ｛ ［ ｔ ｾ ｾ ｃ ｛ ｈ ｝ ｊ
[7] ｐ ｛ ［ ｔ ｊ ｾ Ｈ ｋ ｘ ｉ Ｍ ｌ Ｉ Ｋ Ｈ Ｋ Ｏ ｋ Ｋ ｐ ｔ Ｉ ｯ Ｎ ｸ Ｈ ｰ ｔ Ｉ ｐ ｌ
[BJ ｾ ａ Ｑ ｘ ｜ Ｈ Ｑ ｾ ｐ ｃ Ｉ ｾ ｉ ｾ ｉ Ｋ Ｑ
[9] nSAMPLING FOR VALUE (LOOP 2)
[10] ｓ ｾ ｎ ｾ ｎ ｾ ｜ ｐ ｖ ｸ ｉ ｾ ｬ
[:[1] ｋ ｾ ｄ ,O/Of- 'ENTER SAMPLE 51 ZE '
I:: 12] nMA,JORI TY
[: 13J MH 1++/V+2
[14] A2: nSAMPLE POINT GENERATION
r 1. ｾｮ ｊｾｊＫＫＯＬＮｉｾ ( 1.1';iF') ? 1000
[16J nCONTRACTION OF SAMPLE POINT, ORDER
U.7J ｔ ｾ ﾷ ｎ ｛ Ｋ Ｈ ｐ Ｋ Ｎ ｸ Ｌ ｊ Ｉ ｛ ｎ ｝ ｊ
[IBJ nSEQUENTIAL VOTING, PIVOTAL PLAYER
[19J J.T[+/t,M)+\V[T]]
[20] nVALUE ACCUMUl.ATICIN
[21J ｓ ｛ ｊ ｝ ｾ ｓ ｛ ｊ ｊ Ｋ ｬ
[221 ｾ ａ Ｒ ｘ ｜ ｋ ｾ ｉ ｾ ｉ Ｋ ｬ
[23J nPlAYERS, VOTES, VALUES (2 NORMALIZATIONS)
ｃｾＴｊ ｓｾｾＨＴＬ pS)pN,V, (S·H+/SH-+/V) ,S++/S
v
C
1. 2
3 ()
4 ()
V
2 1. 1 1
C VALUE V
ENTER C()U.. USION PARAMETER
n:
0
FNTEH SAMPLE SIZE
0:
ｾ Ｎ Ｚ ｩ ｏ Ｈ Ｉ
:L ｾｬ ?63 O. !.'.'j26...
? 1 0.7 0.14
Ｚ ｾ 1 0.84 0.168
4 1. 0.83 0.166
C VALUE V
ENTER COLLUSION PARAMETER
n:
().ｾＢＬ
ENTER ｾＢ［ａｍｐｌｅ SIZE
n:
ｾ ［ ［ ｏ Ｈ Ｉ
:I ? 2.95 O. ｾ ｪ Ｙ
" 1 1..02 0.204,'.
:.3 1. O. ::)5 0.1. .l
4 1. 0.48 0.096
C VALUE: V
ENTER COl.LUSION PARAMETER
u:
0.99999
ENTER SAMPLE SIZE
nr.
ｾ［ｯｯ
2 3. ｾ Ｚ ［ Ｔ 0.108
" 1 :1..46 0.292-:.
:3 1 0 0
4 1. () 0
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FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1/. It is important to realize that the equiprobability
of coalitions of the same size in Shapley's value is not a con-
sequence of axiom 1, as is often erroneously assumed (e.g. Owen;
Political Games, p.346)
but is implicit in the ｰ ｾ ｭ ｬ ｡ ｴ ･ that the characteristic function
is sufficient to describe the game. Shapley (p.311. A Value for
a n-person game) tacitly invokes the principal of insufficient
reason to arrive at (1.3). Axiom 1, in contrast, brings about
only equal sharing of the spoils of a coalition among players in
symmetric games, out of which more general games are then construct-
ed, with the help of axiom 3.
A move to introduce additional information to differentiate
the probabilities of coalitions is thus a true generalization of
Shapley's value, since no violation of the 3 axioms occurs.
Footnote 2/. It is easy to verify in a graphic example with 3
players on a circle, that the above framework assigns higher prob-
abilities to ordering in which players that are close (in affinity
and on the sphere) appear contiguously. A general proof of this
proposition might be constructed using displaced dual cones, but
Owen does not do so; he also takes for granted another, albeit
intuitively suggestive result, namely that higher probabilities of
orderings with clusters of friendly players increase the likelihood
of coalitions containing these clusters (see theorem 3.2.) .
Footnote 3/. For instance, in large majority games, of which we
tested several computationally on a half circle as suggested by
Owen, some single player toward the middle of the affinity spectrum
has an impossibly high power spike, i.e. his value is up to 10
times his voting weight, while his equally deserving neighbors with
similar numbers of votes receive small values.
Footnote 4/. For our simplicial approach, uniformity of the
distribution of sample points is not essential, as long as the dis-
tribution is centrally symmetric. In contrast, an adaptation of
the sampling procedure to Owen's spheres depends vitally on the
uniformity of sample points on the sphere, because there the n!
sections are not arrayed around a center (as in the simplex), but
are distributed like countries on a globe. See also Section 2.
-20-
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